Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1988

Jeff Q. Tucker v. Deon N. Dove : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
George E. Mangan; attorney for respondent.
Fred D. Howard, Leslie W. Slaugh; attorneys for appellants.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Tucker v. Dove, No. 880350 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1140

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

If I A H C O U R T f**"

- Pt»s?ALS

•c*r
^ "r

NO.

%%0*

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JEFF Q. TUCKER,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 880350-CA

vs.
DEON N. DOVE, dba
DOVE'S HAPPY SERVICE,
a corporation, BENITO M. VAN,
and JOHN DOES 1 through 10,

Category 14b

Defendants-Appellants.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT ENTERED
BY THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
THE HONORABLE DENNIS L. DRANEY PRESIDING

FRED D. HOWARD and
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84601
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS

GEORGE E. MANGAN, Esq.
BOX AE
Ashton, Idaho 83420
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT

FILED
SEP 6 1988
COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JEFF Q. TUCKER,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 880350-CA

vs.
DEON N. DOVE, dba
DOVE'S HAPPY SERVICE,
a corporation, BENITO M. VAN,
and JOHN DOES 1 through 10,

Category 14b

Defendants-Appellants.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT ENTERED
BY THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
THE HONORABLE DENNIS L. DRANEY PRESIDING

FRED D. HOWARD and
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
120 East 3 00 North
Provo, Utah 84601
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS

GEORGE E. MANGAN, Esq.
Box AE
Ashton, Idaho 83420
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

1

ISSUES PRESENTED

1

RELEVANT STATUTES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

'

2

A.

Nature of the Case

2

B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.

C.

Statement of Facts

. .

2
3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

5

ARGUMENT

7

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING IS INTERNALLY INCONSISTENT. .
A.

B.

7

Detention
and
Arrest
are
Inseparably
Connected and Probable Cause for One is
Necessarily Probable Cause for the Other. .

7

Even if Detention and Arrest are Considered
Separately,
Probable
Cause
for
Arrest
Existed as a Matter of Law

10

POINT II
AN AWARD OF PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST IS IMPROPER
CONCLUSION

16
18

APPENDIX
A.

Statutes
1.
2.

Utah Code Ann. §
[Theft—Elements.]

76-6-404

(1978)

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-602 (Supp. 1988)
[Retail theft, acts constituting.]

A-l
A-l

3.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-603 (Supp. 1988)
[Detention of suspected violator by
merchant—Purposes.]

A

4.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-604 (Supp. 1988)
[Defense to action by person detained.] . . . A

5.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-14 (1982, amended
by 1987 Utah Laws ch. 245, § 10)
[Person causing detention or arrest of
person
suspect
of
shoplifting
or
library
theft—Civil
and
criminal
immunity.]

Ruling (R. 101-02)
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 13843)
Judgment (R. 144-45)

ii

A

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Cited;
Bennion v. State Bd. of Oil, Gas & Mining, 675 P.2d 1135
(Utah 1983)

17

Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. f 666 P.2d
302 (Utah 1983)

17

Draeger v. Grand Cent., Inc.f
1974)

504 F.2d

142

(10th Cir.
8

First Sec. Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. Feedyards, Inc., 653 P.2d
591 (Utah 1982)
Golden Key Realty v. Mantas. 699 P.2d 730 (Utah 1985).

. . . 17

Gonzales v. Harris. 34 Colo. App. 282, 528 P.2d 259 (1974),
rev'd on other grounds, 189 Colo. 518, 542 P.2d 842
(1975)
Jordon v. Mangel Stores, 336 S.2d 278 (La. App. 1976).

18

15

8, 13-14

Jorgensen v. John Clay & Co., 660 P.2d 229 (Utah 1983). . . . 17
State v. Barber. 747 P.2d 436 (Utah App. 1987)
State v. Bender. 581 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1978)
State v. Eagle. 611 P.2d 1211 (Utah 1980)
State v. Walker. 649 P.2d 16 (Utah 1982)
State v. Watts. 639 P. 2d 158 (Utah 1981)

15, 16
10
10, 11
12
10

Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (1979),
modified. 617 P. 2d 700 (Utah 1980)
7, 15
Town of Jackson v. Shaw, 569 P.2d 1246 (Wyo. 1977)
18

Statutes and Rules Cited;
R. Utah S. Ct. 4(d)

3

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978)

2, 12

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-602 (Supp. 1987)
iii

2, 11, 12, 15

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-603 (Supp. 1987)

2, 9

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-604 (Supp. 1987)

2, 10, 16

Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-14 (1982, amended by 1987 Utah Laws
ch. 245, § 10)

2, 9, 10

Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-14(1) (Supp. 1988)

9

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (i) (1987)

1

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1987)

1

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (h) (1987)

1

Other Authorities Cited:
Annot., Construction and Effect. In False Imprisonment
Action, of Statute Providing for Detention of Suspected Shoplifters. 47 A.L.R. 3d 998 (1973)

13

Black's Law Dictionary 105 (5th Ed. 1979)

14

Utah Legislative Survey - 1979, Retail Theft, 1980 Utah L.
Rev. 193

14

W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law 622 (1972)

15

iv

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JEFF Q. TUCKER,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent,

:

vs.

Case No. 880350-CA

:

DEON N. DOVE, dba
:
DOVE'S HAPPY SERVICE,
a corporation, BENITO M. VAN, :
and JOHN DOES 1 through 10,

Category 14b

Defendants-Appellants.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This is an appeal from a judgment entered after a non-jury
trial.

The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction over this appeal

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (i) (1987), and transferred the case to this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(4).

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §

78-2a-3(2)(h).
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Were the findings of the District Court internally

inconsistent, where the court found that defendant Benito Van
had probable

cause to

suspect plaintiff

of shoplifting

and

therefore to detain him, yet found that Mr. Van did not have
probable

cause

to

sign

plaintiff had shoplifted?

a

criminal

citation

alleging

that

2.

Was the plaintiff entitled to an award of pre-judgment

interest on the general damage award for humiliation?

RELEVANT STATUTES
The provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404 (1978), 76-6602 (Supp. 1988), 76-6-603 (Supp. 1988), 76-6-604 (Supp. 1988),
and 77-7-14 (1982, amended by 1987 Utah Laws ch. 245, § 10),
regarding retail theft and detention and arrest of suspected
violators, are set forth in Appendix MA".
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case,

This is a tort action for damages alleged to have been
suffered by plaintiff when he was detained and accused of shoplifting

by

defendants

and

subsequently

arrested

based

on

defendantsf complaint.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below,

This action was filed on May 23, 1986 (R. 1), and was tried
before The Honorable Dennis L. Draney, sitting without a jury,
on September 15, 1987.

(R. 144, 168). The trial court issued a

Ruling (R. 101-02) on September 22, 1987, determining the issues
substantially in favor of plaintiff, and formal Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law (R. 138-43) and a Judgment

(R. 144-45)

were entered on February 1, 1988.
An Order for Extension of Time to Appeal was entered by the
court on March 7, 1988.

(R. 154.)

2

Defendants1 Notice of Appeal

was filed on March 28, 1988 (R. 156) and plaintiff's Notice of
Cross-Appeal was filed on April 15, 1988.x
C.

(R. 165.)

Statement of Facts.

On November 19, 1985, plaintiff and three of his friends
entered

Dove's

Happy

Service,

a

retail

grocery

store

in

Roosevelt, Utah, which is owned and operated by Deon N. Dove.
(R. 227, 229, 372.)

Conflicting evidence was offered concerning

what happened in the store.

A security guard employed by Mr.

Dove, Benito M. Van, testified that he was on a "catwalk" above
the store floor at the time the boys entered the store.
observed

plaintiff

splitter, and

open

then

pocket. (R. 391.)

a

remove

package
and

for

conceal

a

television

the

splitter

He

cable
in his

Mr. Van left the catwalk to go to the store

floor to apprehend plaintiff, and was unable to view plaintiff's
actions for a period of time.

(R. 391-92.)

Upon reaching the

store floor, he was stopped by and talked for several minutes
with an acquaintance, James Wymer, who was one of the friends
who had come in with plaintiff.

(R. 292-96; 392.)

The boys

congregated at a magazine rack and prepared to leave. (R. 392.)
Mr. Van apprehended plaintiff and one of his companions, Toby
Clark, just before the boys left the store. (R. 393.)
Plaintiff and his friends testified that they had entered

Appellant has filed herewith a Motion to Dismiss asserting
that the cross-appeal was untimely. R. Utah S. Ct. 4(d).
3

the store for the purpose of purchasing some speaker wire.2
They proceeded to the aisle containing electrical parts, but en
route James Wymer met and stopped to talk with Mr. Van. (R. 2 32,
295-96.)

The remaining three boys went down the aisle contain-

ing electrical parts and began to look for speaker wire.

The

boys1 testimony was inconsistent as to whether they could see
Mr. Van, or Mr. Van see them, while they were down the aisle.
(E.g., R. 255, 259, 301, 306.)

The boys all agreed that the TV

splitter package was already open, and that plaintiff removed
the splitter, inspected

it for a while, left the now empty

package on the shelf, and discarded the splitter on another
shelf at the end of the aisle. (R. 233-35,325-26, 352-53, 360.)
All parties agreed that Mr. Van approached the boys at the
front of the store, and plaintiff and one of his friends, who
had

been

in

close

proximity

to

plaintiff

when

the

events

surrounding the cable splitter occurred, willingly complied with
Mr. Van's request that they accompany him to a room at the rear
of the store.

(R. 238, 263-65.)

Mr. Van and a store manager

told the two boys they were suspected of shoplifting, and the
boys denied the accusations and offered to allow themselves to
be searched. (R. 240.)

Mr. Van and the manager stated that

they would summon the police to perform a search. (Id.)

2

The

The complaint alleged that they had entered the store for
the purpose of inspecting a "switch" which he wanted, and that
plaintiff did inspect a "switch" box which he discovered to be
empty. (R. 2.)
The complaint was amended at trial to alleged
that one of plaintiff's friends was seeking speaker wire.
(R. 378, 489.)
4

police were summoned and searched plaintiff and his friend, but
failed to locate the cable splitter.

(R. 241.)

Mr. Van

identified plaintiff as the individual who had pocketed the
item, and the friend was allowed to leave. (R.

241.)

Mr. Van

signed a citation issued by the police which charged plaintiff
with shoplifting
arrest.

(R. 368-70) and plaintiff was placed under

(R. 241-42, 364-65.)

Plaintiff was escorted by two

police officers outside the store, handcuffed, taken to the
police

station, booked,

and

jailed.

(R.

241-45.)

He was

released from jailed upon his mother posting bail of $106.00.
(R. 245.)
Plaintiff

acknowledged

that

Mr.

Van's

and

the

store

manager's treatment of him was civil and courteous at all times.
(R. 263-65; see also R. 395-96.)
After plaintiff had been arrested and had left the store,
Mr. Van discovered the cable splitter concealed behind packages
of potato chips at the end of the aisle, and delivered the
splitter to the police (R. 394.)
The criminal charges against plaintiff were dismissed upon
plaintiff's motion. (R. 56, 176-77, 249.)

Plaintiff testified

that he paid $750.00 to his attorney for representation in the
criminal matter. (R. 249.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
By finding that defendants had probable cause to detain and
cause the search of the plaintiff, the trial court implicitly
accepted the testimony of defendant Benito Van over that of the

plaintiff.

The accounts of the parties are polarized.

The

trial court believed the testimony of Mr. Van, who described
plaintiff's removal of the splitter from its package and his
placing it in his pocket.

The detention and subsequent arrest

of the plaintiff are inseparably connected acts, and separate
standards

for

probable

cause

do

not

apply.

Rather,

when

probable cause exists to believe that the crime of retail theft
has occurred, such probable cause extends both to detention and
to arrest.
Even if detention and arrest are considered

separately,

probable cause existed for plaintiff's arrest as a matter of
law.

The mere taking or concealing of store property, such as

witnessed by Mr. Van, is sufficient to constitute the crime of
retail theft.

It is irrelevant whether the store property was

found on plaintiff's person or in its secreted location prior to
the arrest.

The trial court erred in holding that probable

cause existed for the detention but did not also exist for the
arrest.
If the decision of the trial court is affirmed as to civil
liability,

then

the

award

of

prejudgment

interest

must

be

reversed.

A general damages award for humiliation or false

arrest is not one which can be calculated with mathematical
accuracy and prejudgment interest is not allowable for such an
award.

6

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING IS
INTERNALLY INCONSISTENT.
The

trial

court

ruled

that

defendants

"were

without

probable cause to take any action beyond the initial detention
and search"

(R. 102, 142), and thereby implicitly held that

defendants had sufficient cause for the initial detention and
search.

These rulings are inconsistent as a matter of law.

It

appears from the record that the bases for the trial court's
ruling were the trial court's erroneous determination of two
issues.

First, the trial court apparently concluded that only

reasonable cause was required

for the initial detention and

search, whereas probable cause was required
(R. 216-24,

476.)

Second,

the

trial

court

for the arrest.
concluded

that

finding the allegedly stolen item on the plaintiff's person was
a prerequisite to the existence of probable cause. (R. 102.)
A.
Detention and Arrest are Inseparably Connected and
Probable Cause for One is Necessarily Probable Cause for the
Other.
Where, as in the present case, a dispute exists as to the
principal

facts in a shoplifting case, the determination of

reasonableness and probable cause, which are requisite for the
statutory protection against false arrest charges, is primarily
a question of fact to be resolved by the finder of fact.

Terry

v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314, 320-21 (1979),

7

modified, 617 P.2d 700 (Utah 1980).

Accord Draeger v. Grand

Cent., Inc., 504 F.2d 142, 144 (10th Cir. 1974).
By finding that Benito Van had probable cause to detain and
cause the search of the plaintiff, the trial court implicitly
accepted the testimony of Benito Van as to the events which
occurred in the store.3
279

Jordon v. Mangel Stores, 336 S.2d 278,

(La. App. 1976) (where trial court found that defendants

were reasonably justified in detaining and arresting plaintiff,
it

therefore

must

have

been

unable

to

accept

plaintiff's

testimony of the events surrounding the alleged shoplifting).
Probable cause to detain and cause a search of the plaintiff
necessarily is probable cause for the arrest of the plaintiff.
The trial court implicitly found there was probable cause to
believe

plaintiff

had

committed

retail

theft.

With

this

probable cause, defendants were authorized by Utah law to detain
the plaintiff in a reasonable manner and surrender him to the
police, which is precisely what they did.

(R. 238-42.)

Any merchant who has probable cause to
believe that a person has committed retail
theft may detain such person, on or off the
premises of a retail mercantile establishment, in a reasonable manner and for a
reasonable length of time for all or any of
the following purposes:
3

No other conclusion could reasonably be made from the
evidence presented.
Although plaintiff and his friends testified that Benito Van was unable to see them at the time the
concealment of store property allegedly took place (R. 262, 30506, 338), the testimony is inherently unbelievable. It would be
unreasonable to believe that Mr. Van would have stopped the boys
and accused plaintiff of shoplifting if he had not been watching
the boys and if had he not seen plaintiff remove the splitter
from its package.
8

(5) To inform a peace officer of the
detention of the person and surrender that
person to the custody of a peace officer[.]
Utah Code Ann, § 76-6-603 (Supp. 1988).
Nowhere in the Utah statutes or case law are separate
standards applied for arrest and detention in shoplifting.

The

standard of "reasonable and probable cause to believe the person
committed a theft of goods" is applied to both detention and
arrest:
A peace officer, merchant, or merchant's
employee, servant, or agent who causes the
detention of a person as provided in § 77-712, or who causes the arrest of a person for
theft of goods held or displayed for sale
shall not be criminally or civilly liable
where he has reasonable and probable grounds
to believe the person detained or arrested
committed a theft of goods held or displayed
for sale.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-14 (1982, amended by 1987 Utah Laws ch.
245, § 10)4(emphasis added).
as

a defense

not

only

A merchant may use probable cause

against

actions

arising

out

of the

detention of a suspected shoplifter (such as unlawful detention
or false imprisonment), but also against actions arising out of
the arrest of the suspected shoplifter as well (such as false
arrest).
In any action for false arrest, false
imprisonment, unlawful detention, defamation
4

The 1987 amendment changed the phrase "reasonable and
probable grounds" to "reasonable and probable cause" and made
some stylistic changes.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-14(1) (Supp.
1988) .
Q

of character, assault, trespass, or invasion
of civil rights brought by any person
detained by the merchant, it shall be a
defense to such action that the merchant
detaining such person had probable cause to
believe that the person had committed retail
theft and that the merchant acted reasonably
under all circumstances.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-604 (Supp. 1988)(emphasis added).
The trial court found that Benito Van had probable cause to
detain the plaintiff.

Mr. Van watched the plaintiff remove an

item from a store display and conceal that item in his pocket.
(R. 391.)

This act gave rise to a reasonable and probable cause

for Benito Van to believe that plaintiff had committed a theft
of goods displayed for sale.

Section 77-7-14 provides that when

such a reasonable and probable cause exists, and the suspected
person is detained and arrested, there is no civil liability on
the part of the merchant.

The standard

of reasonable and

probable cause is not bifurcated, rather it is the same for
arrest as for detention.
B.
Even
if
Detention
and
Arrest
are
Considered
Separately, Probable Cause for Arrest Existed as a Matter of
Law.
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held:
that an item need not be taken from a retailer^ premises to constitute the crime of
theft, but that a defendant's acts of
exercising unauthorized control over an item
within a retail establishment was sufficient.
State v. Watts, 639 P.2d 158, 162 (Utah 1981).

Accord State v.

Eagle, 611 P.2d 1211 (Utah 1980); State v. Bender, 581 P.2d 1019
(Utah 1978).
10

When Benito Van witnessed the plaintiff remove an item from
the store shelf and secret it in his pocket, Mr. Van then had
reasonable and probable cause to believe that a crime had been
committed.5

It is irrelevant that the item was not found on the

plaintiff's person when he was detained and searched or that the
item was not found in its place of concealment in the store
until after the citation was signed.

It is not necessary for an

individual to be successful in his attempt at shoplifting in
order to have committed a crime.
The fact that defendant was unable to escape
undetected is of no consequence, for escape
is not a necessary element of the crime of
theft. Nor is he to be absolved of guilt by
his abandonment of the loot anymore than
would a bank robber, burglar, or other lawbreaker, who throws away, or otherwise
abandons, the fruits of his crime.
State v. Eagle, 611 P.2d 1211, 1213 (Utah 1980).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-602 (Supp. 1988) provides that:
A person commits the offense of retail theft
when he knowingly:
(1) takes possession of, conceals, carries
away, transfers or causes to be carried away
or transferred, any merchandise displayed,
held, stored or offered for sale in a retail
mercantile establishment with the intention
of retaining such merchandise or with the
intention of depriving the merchant permanently of the possession, use or benefit of
5

The analysis set forth in this Point applies even if the
plaintiff's witnesses are believed. The plaintiff admitted to
removing the splitter from its package and carrying it away some
distance from where it had been located. Although a prosecutor
in his or her discretion may choose not to prosecute such a
case, probable cause to believe a crime was committed nonetheless existed at the point that plaintiff proceeded to walk away
with the splitter.
11

such merchandise without paying the retail
value of such merchandise;
(Emphasis added.)
This section, while enacted specifically to cover shoplifting, does not supercede § 76-6-404 (1978) which, prior to
the enactment of § 76-6-602, covered shoplifting.

It provides

that a "person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the property of another with a purpose to
deprive him

thereof."

In applying

this

statute, the Utah

Supreme Court held in State v. Walker. 649 P. 2d 16, 17 (Utah
1982), that a person could be found guilty "without ever finding
that

he

'obtained'

the

property,

unauthorized control thereof."

so

long

as

he

exercised

In the present case, the trial

court concluded that "having found no property of the store on
plaintiff's

person

or

where

it

could

have

been

placed

by

plaintiff, until after the citation was signed and the arrest
made, defendants were without probable cause to take any action
beyond

the initial detention and search."

(R. 102.)

This

conclusion is erroneous since Mr. Van had probable cause to
believe that the plaintiff had committed retail theft.

It was

not necessary to find the store's property on the plaintiff, or
in its secreted location, in order to establish the probable
cause.

Benito Van witnessed

the act of retail theft, and

therefore had probable cause to sign the arrest citation.
Clearly, the most significant aspect of
these [modern shoplifting] statutes, from
the merchant's standpoint, is that the
propriety, if not the legality, of the
arrest, is no longer dependent upon a
12

finding, either in the false imprisonment
action or in a criminal proceeding for
shoplifting, that the suspect was actually
guilty of the offense.
Annot., Construction and Effect, In False Imprisonment Action,
of Statute Providing for Detention of Suspected Shoplifters, 47
A.L.R. 3d 998, 1005 (1973) (emphasis added).
In Jordon v. Mangel Stores, 336 S.2d 278 (La. App. 1976), a
factually similar case applying Louisiana's shoplifting statutes, which are similar to the Utah statutes, a store security
guard saw the plaintiff break open a socket wrench set and
remove one of the sockets.

The plaintiff apparently saw the

guard watching him, because he concealed the socket and began to
walk toward the front of the store.

The security guard pursued

the plaintiff, but was unable to catch up until the plaintiff
was almost out of the store.

The guard stopped the plaintiff at

the door

and

the

searched.

The socket was not found on plaintiff's person.

took him

to

store

office, where he was
The

plaintiff denied the shoplifting accusation, even denying that
he went into the hardware department of the store.

Plaintiff

was then formally arrested and was later tried on the charges
and acquitted.

Jordon at 279.

The Jordon court held that it was clear from the record
that

if the store guard's testimony

in the civil case was

accepted, the defendants had probable and reasonable cause for
both the detention and the arrest.

The court reached this

decision without stating whether or not the socket was ever
found,

which

demonstrates

that

the

court

considered

this

information to be unnecessary.

The court went on to note that

if the plaintiff's testimony was accepted, there could be no
such reasonable cause.
since the trial

Id. at 279-80.

court held

The court found that

that defendants were

reasonably

justified in their actions, they must therefore have been unable
to accept the plaintiff's testimony.

Id. at 280.

The facts of the present case are very similar to Jordon
with the exception that the trial court did not find that Benito
Van had probable cause to sign the arrest citation, although he
did have probable cause to detain and search the plaintiff.
This probable cause existed because Mr. Van reasonably believed
plaintiff

committed

an act of retail theft.

Following the

Jordon court analysis, the defendants in the present case should
have no civil

liability

for the detention

and arrest of a

suspected shoplifter when the act of shoplifting was witnessed
by a store employee, regardless of whether the store item was
found on the alleged shoplifter's person.
Further

reinforcing

the

principle

that

removing

and

concealing an item constitutes theft is the common law crime of
larceny.

An element of common law larceny is asportation which

is "[t]he removal of things from one place to another."
Law Dictionary 105 (5th Ed. 1979).

Black's

"Because larceny is complete

upon the asportation, however slight, of another's property, the
mere taking of a displayed item and concealing it, with the
requisite intent, would be sufficient to support a conviction
for larceny."

Utah Legislative Survey - 1979, Retail Theftf
14

1980 Utah L. Rev. 193, 195 n. 253, citing, W. LaFave & A. Scott,
Criminal Law 622, 631-32 (1972).
Utah

Code

Ann.

§

76-6-602

(Supp.

1988)

requires,

in

addition to concealment, that there be an intention to deprive
the merchant permanently of the possession of the merchandise in
order for the crime of retail theft to have been committed.
Removing an item from the store without paying the retail value
would be conclusive evidence of intent; however, such removal is
not required.

Under Colorado's shoplifting statutes, it has

been held that "concealment of goods is prima facia evidence of
the intent to commit the crime of theft."

Gonzales v. Harris,

34 Colo. App. 282, 528 P.2d 259, 262-63 (1974), rev'd on other
grounds, 189 Colo. 518, 542 P.2d 842 (1975).

Moreover, the Utah

Supreme Court has held that:
even if the crime was not in fact being
committed or attempted, if the defendant, in
good faith believes that such facts are
present as to lead him to an honest conclusion that a crime is being committed by
the person to be arrested, then he may not
be held liable for false arrest.
Terry, 605 P.2d at 320.
In State v. Barber, 747 P.2d 436 (Utah App. 1987), Barber
appealed his conviction of retail theft.

The facts of the case

reveal that a store security guard had witnessed Barber directing his son to conceal a package, which was later discovered to
contain a video recorder.

One of the issues on appeal was

whether a theft of that recorder in fact occurred since it was
never removed from the store, but was merely concealed on the

premises.

Id. at 437-38.

In affirming Barber's conviction of

retail theft, the Utah Court of Appeals stated:
On the issue of his intent, Barber chooses
to ignore that, under our statute, theft is
committed by taking possession, concealing,
transferring or causing to be carried away
or transferred, any merchandise. The fact
that the recorder was not "carried away" out
of the store makes no difference. There is
ample evidence to support the conclusion
that Barber directed the taking and hiding
of the recorder —
acts sufficient to
constitute concealment or transfer under the
statute — with the intent to permanently
deprive ZCMI of it.
Id. at 440.

Mr. Van watched the plaintiff remove an item from

its package and conceal it in his pocket.

This act is suffi-

cient to give rise to the honest conclusion that plaintiff
intended to deprive the store of its property, and therefore,
that a crime had been committed.
The trial court correctly implicitly found that defendants
had probable cause to suspect that plaintiff had committed the
crime of retail theft, and that defendants could not, therefore,
be held civilly liable for detaining and causing the search of
the plaintiff.

However, the trial court erred in finding that

the probable cause which defendants had, did not extend to
signing the criminal citation.
POINT II
AN AWARD OF PRE-JUDGMENT
INTEREST IS IMPROPER.
Defendants

are

protected

from

civil

present case by the Utah Retail Theft Act.
16

liability

in

the

However, if this

Court affirms the civil damages award of the trial court, the
award

of

prejudgment

interest

is

improper.

In

the

final

judgment of the trial court in the present case, entered on
February 1, 1988, an award of pre-judgment interest was granted.
(R. 145.)

The damages award given to plaintiff was based upon

the "humiliation11 caused by the arrest.

(R. 102, 145.)

In such

a case as this, where the amount of a loss cannot be calculated
with mathematical accuracy, an award of prejudgment interest is
never proper.
Prejudgment interest may be awarded in a
case where the loss is fixed as of a
particular time and the amount of the loss
can be calculated with mathematical accuracy .
Jorcrensen v. John Clay & Co. , 660 P.2d 229, 233

(Utah 1983)

(citations omitted).
There are numerous examples in Utah case law of situations
in which an amount of loss can be calculated with mathematical
accuracy

and,

appropriate.

therefore,

a

prejudgment

interest

award

is

See, e.g. Golden Key Realty v. Mantas, 699 P. 2d

730 (Utah 1985) (liquidated damages on accord and satisfaction
of exclusive real estate listing agreement); Bennion v. State
Bd. of Oil, Gas & Mining, 675 P. 2d 1135 (Utah 1983) (mineral
royalties owed); Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins,
Co.,

666 P. 2d 3 02

(Utah 1983)

document by escrow agent).

(negligent

acknowledgment of

However, in cases that involve

damages for things such as mental anguish or punitive damages,

17

the Utah Supreme Court has held that prejudgment interest is
inappropriate.
As to the awards for mental anguish and
punitive
damages,
however,
prejudgment
interest is inappropriate . . • . [The] rule
clearly precludes prejudgment interest on
the court's mental anguish and punitive
damages awards, which were not fixed or
ascertainable before the time of trial.
First Sec. Bank of Utah v, J.B.J. Feedyards, Inc., 653 P.2d 591,
600 (Utah 1982).

A damages award for humiliation is of the same

character as damages for mental anguish.

In each case, no

amount of loss can be mathematically calculated.

Moreover, it

has been held that damages, in general, for actions involving
restraint of a person, such as false imprisonment
arrest, are not mathematically calculable.

or false

Therefore, they do

not give rise to an award for prejudgment interest.
[T]he amount of money which will compensate
one for an unwarranted restraint of his
person cannot realistically be the subject
of exact computation. The question involves
such emotions as humiliation, shame and
public disgrace, which are not capable of
calculable qualification.
Town of Jackson v. Shaw, 569 P.2d 1246, 1251 (Wyo. 1977).

In

the present case, an award of prejudgment interest clearly is
error.
CONCLUSION
When probable cause exists to believe that the crime of
retail theft has occurred, such probable cause applies both to
the detention

and to the arrest of the

suspect.

Even if

detention and arrest are considered separately, however, in the

present case probable cause existed for the arrest as a matter
of law.

The trial court erred in holding that probable cause

existed for the detention but did not also exist for the arrest.
The decision of the trial court that probable cause existed for
the detention and search be affirmed, but the decision that
probable cause did not exist for actions beyond the detention
and

search

should

be

reversed.

The judgment

in

favor of

plaintiff must accordingly be reversed, and the case remanded
with instructions to enter judgment of no cause of action.
If the decision of the trial court

is affirmed

as to

liability, the award of prejudgment interest is inappropriate
and should be reversed since the damages award is not one which
can be calculated with mathematical accuracy.
DATED this 1st day of September, 1988.

F R E D D T H O W A E D a n d / ]U
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for DefendantsAppellants
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this
1st day of September, 1988.
Mr. George E. Mangan
Attorney for Respondent
Box AE
Ashton, Idaho 83420
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APPENDIX "A"
STATUTES

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978).

Theft—Elements.

A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the property of another with a purpose
to deprive him thereof.

Utah

Code Ann. § 76-6-602
constituting.

A person
knowingly:

commits

the

(Supp. 1988).
offense

of

Retail theft, acts

retail

theft

when

he

(1) Takes possession of, conceals, carries away, transfers or causes to be carried away or transferred, any merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered for sale in a
retail
mercantile establishment with the intention of retaining such
merchandise or with the intention of depriving the merchant
permanently of the possession, use or benefit of such merchandise without paying the retail value of such merchandise; or
(2) Alters, transfers, or removes any label, price tag,
marking, indicia of value or any other markings which aid in
determining value of any merchandise displayed, held, stored or
offered for sale, in a retail mercantile establishment and
attempts to purchase such merchandise personally or in consort
with another at less than the retail value with the intention of
depriving the merchant of the retail value of such merchandise;
or
(3)Transfers any merchandise displayed, held, stored or
offered for sale in a retail mercantile establishment from the
container in or on which such merchandise is displayed to any
other container with the intention of depriving the merchant of
the retail value of such merchandise; or
(4) Under-rings with the intention of depriving
merchant of the retail value of the merchandise; or

the

(5) Removes a shopping cart from the premises of a retail
mercantile establishment with the intent of depriving the
merchant of the possession, use or benefit of such cart.

a-i

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-603 (Supp. 1988).
violator by merchant—Purposes.

Detention of suspected

Any merchant who has probable cause to believe that
person has committed retail theft may detain such person, on
off the premises of a retail mercantile establishment, in
reasonable manner and for a reasonable length of time for all
any of the following purposes:

a
or
a
or

(1) To make reasonable inquiry as to whether such person
has in his possession ?)unpurchased merchandise and to make
reasonable investigation of the ownership of such merchandise;
(2)

To request identification;

(3)

To verify such identification;

(4) To make a reasonable request of such person to place
or keep in full view any merchandise such individual may have
removed, or which the merchant has reason to believe he may have
removed, from its place of display or elsewhere, whether for
examination, purchase or for any other reasonable purpose;
(5) To inform a peace officer of the detention of the
person and surrender that person to the custody of a peace
officer;
(6) In the case of a minor, to inform a peace officer, the
parents, guardian or other private person interested in the
welfare of that minor immediately, if possible, of this
detention and to surrender custody of such minor to such
person.
A merchant may make a detention as permitted herein off the
premises of a retail mercantile establishment only if such
detention is pursuant to an immediate pursuit of such person.

A-2

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-604 (Supp. 1988).
person detained.

Defense to action by

In any action for false arrest, false imprisonment,
unlawful detention, defamation of character, assault, trespass,
or invasion of civil rights brought by any person detained by
the merchant, it shall be a defense to such action that the
merchant detaining such person had probable cause to believe
that the person had committed retail theft and that the merchant
acted reasonably under all circumstances.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-14 (1982, amended by 1987 Utah Laws ch.
245, § 10) Person causing detention or arrest of person
suspected of shoplifting — Civil and criminal immunity.
A peace officer, merchant, or merchant's employee,
servant, or agent who causes the detention of a person as
provided in section 77-7-12, or who causes the arrest of a
person for theft of goods held or displayed for sale shall not
criminally or civilly liable where he has reasonable and
probable grounds to believe the person detained or arrested
committed a theft of goods held or displayed for sale.
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APPENDIX "B"
Ruling, September 22, 1987

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
in and for Duchesne County
of the State of Utah
CIVIL MINUTE ENTRY
JEFF Q. TUCKER

NO. 86-CV-94-D

VS.

DATE: SEPTEMBER 22, 1987

DEON N. DOVE, dba DOVE HAPPY
SERVICE, a corporation, BENITO
M. VAN, and John Does 1-10

JUDGE: DENNIS L. DRANEY

RULING
Having fully considered the evidence and argunents of counsel, the Court
finds that:
(1) Defendant Benito Van was, at all times relevant hereto, an agent of
defendant Deon Dove, and acting in the scope of that agency.
(2) Defendant Van, with the assistance of others, detained plaintiff, and
caused plaintiff to be searched by police officers.
(3) No property belonging to defendant's store was found on plaintiff, and
none was found where it could have been placed by plaintiff, until after the
citation was issued and the arrest made.
(4) Defendant Van signed the citation, and plaintiff was taken into
custody by officers of the Roosevelt City Police Department and, was booked and
released after posting bond in the sum of $106.00.
(5) Criminal action was commenced against plaintiff by Roosevelt City, but
was dismissed before trial upon Tucker's (plaintiff herein) Motion to
Dismiss.
(6) Plaintiff employed counsel to represent him in the criminal action at
the cost of $750.00.
(7) Plaintiff suffered humiliation at being escorted from the store,
through the public exit in the view of his friends and others.

'-^rKMAfiET7. Clerk

Olvix

(8) Plaintiff's public record will show the filing of the criminal
charges, which record may be expunged within the time provided by law.
(9)

Based upon the foregoing Findings, the court concludes that:

(1) Having found no property of the store on plaintiff's person or
where it could have been placed by plaintiff, until after the citation was
signed and the arrest made. Defendants were without probable cause to
take any action beyond the initial detention and search.
(2) The actions of the defendants were not done maliciously, even
though no probable cause existed for the arrest.
(3) Plaintiff is entitled to general damages for money expended,
and for his public humiliation.
(4)

Plaintiff is not entitled to punitive damages.

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, and Conclusions of Law, it is
hereby ordered that Plaintiff is awarded judgment as follows:
(a) $750.00 attorneys fees for defense of the criminal
action.
(b) $106.00 for the bond posted if the same was not
returned to plaintiff or his mother.
(c) $2,500.00 for the humiliation caused by his arrest.
Plaintiff's counsel is requested to prepare formal Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment in accordance with this ruling, and the
provisions of Rule 2.9, Rules of Practice.

DATED:

JJI^LJ^^

S?f9

District Court Judge

copy to:
George E. Mangan
Fred D. Howard
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APPENDIX "C"
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

FT:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

GEORGE E. MANGAN (2068), of
GEORGE E. MANGAN, APC
Attorney for Plaintiff
47 North Second East
Roosevelt, Utah 84066
801-722-2428

DEON N. DOVE, dba DOVE'S
HAPPY SERVICE, a corporation
BENITO M. VAN and JOHN DOES

21

1-10,

•- « ~ r*
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE CCUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JEFF Q. TUCKER,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.

22
23
24
25

1

"-r*i

Civil No. 86-CV-94 D
Judge Dennis L. Draney

Defendants.

The

above

entitled

matter

came on regularly for trial on

26

September 15, 1987, before the Honorable

27

plaintiff was

28

defendants were also present with their attorney Fred D. Howard.

29

Witnesses were called, sworn and did testify.

30

were marked, identified and received into evidence.

Both parties

31

rested, and each argued their case to the Court and

responded to

32

inquiries

matter under

33

advisement.

34
35

of

present with

the

Court.

Draney.

The

his attorney, George E. Mangan.

The

The

Court

Dennis L.

took

Numerous exhibits

the

The Court having heard the evidence and entered

its Ruling,

does now hereby make and enter the fallowing Findings of Fact:
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1.

On

November

19,

1986,

at approximately 6:00 PM, the

plaintiff in the company of three of his friends, was
invitee at

a grocery

store in

a business

Roosevelt, Utah, that belongs to

the defendant Deon Dove2.
was

an

At all times relevant hereto, the
authorized

acting within
particular,

the

agent

of

scope

defendant

the

and

Van

defendant Deon Dove, and was

authority

was

defendant Benito Van

in

of

that

charge

of

agency.

In

security at the

Roosevelt store of defendant Dove.
3.
came to

When plaintiff
the store

had completed

of defendant

exit the same, when he was
accompany Van

and a

Deon Dove

requested

third party

the purpose

by

to a

that he had

for, he was about to
the

defendant

room at

Van to

the rear of the

store so that they could talk to the plaintiff.
4.

Plaintiff voluntarily complied with the request made by

defendant Van, by accompanying Van to the room to the rear of the
store.
5.

In the back

defendant Van

room

wanted to

plaintiff

talk to

him.

inquired

as

to

why the

Van indicated that they

were waiting for the Roosevelt City Police to come.
6.
store, the

When the Roosevelt City Police officers
defendant Van

directed the Police officers to search

plaintiff and another individual.
indicated

that

he

arrived at the

thought

that

The defendant Van specifically
plaintiff

"splitter" from its carton, and he was sure

had

removed

that one

a TV

of the two

bovs had it on them.
Page 2
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62

7.

The

search

of

the

plaintiff

63

Police officers failed to produce any

64

either the

65

the store of the defendant Deon Dove.

plaintiff or

66

8.

67

defendant Van

68

plaintiff

69

Officers to

70

for booking, etc.

71

the plaintiff with shoplifting.

72

When

9.

the

the other

Police

under

arrest,

individual, that belonged to

inquired

and

requested

plaintiff had

Station,

75

shelves in

76

that the plaintiff had stolen.

of

the

the store,

10.

The

the item

plaintiff

was

that the

handcuffed

79

view of his friends and other shoppers.
The

Dove through

Roosevelt

City

and

escorted from the
exit, and

officers

82

i.e., finger-printed,

83

record

84

posting a bond in the sum of *106.00.

85

12.

made.

A

formal

taken, and

Plaintiff

criminal

was

86

plaintiff in the Seventh Circuit

87

Roosevelt Department.

of

released after

commenced against the
the

State

of Utah,

Said criminal action was dismissed before
Page 3
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Court

was

was booked,

a permanent criminal

subsequently

action

in the

transported the

plaintiff to the Police Station, where the plaintiff
mug shot

the Police

defendant Van alleged

a public

Police

under arrest and

81

was

Police

Dove found on one of the

store of the defendant

11.

what the

Roosevelt

officers to

defendant

73

80

the

been placed

74

77

to

The defendant Van signed the citation charging

transported by the Roosevelt City Police
agent

as

to the Roosevelt Police Station

73

an

the person of

do, the defendant Van then placed the

transport plaintiff

After the

the Roosevelt City

property on

Officers

intended to

by

88

the trial.

89

as to

90

Court held that

91

committed a crime.

92

Counsel -for Roosevelt City and Mr. Tucker, stipulated

the -Facts

12.

93

criminal

94

5750.00.

95

13.

and each
as

a

Plaintiff
charges,

submitted a

matter

hired
and

o-f

fees

cuffed and escorted from

97

Roosevelt City Police Officers.

99
100

14.

the

to
for

Plaintiff's public

store

plaintiff

represent
said

of

record will

criminal charges against him.

Based

upon

the

The

the

Defendant

the

Dove by

show the filing of the

Court takes

judicial notice

foregoing

Findings of Fact, the Court now

1 .

Inasmuch as the

defendant

Van

was

an

defendant Dove,

106

the

107

defendant Dove,

108

responsible for the actions complained of herein.

112

in

representation was

105

111

him

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

104

110

had not

makes and enters the following

103

109

The

that said record may be expunged within the time provided by law.

101
102

the

Law.

Plaintiff suffered humiliation at being arrested, hand-

96

98

law,

counsel

the

memorandum of

agency

2.

agent

of the

and was acting within the scope and authority of

that

existed
then as

between
a matter

The plaintiff was a

the

defendant

Van

and the

of law, the defendant Dove is

business invitee

of the defendant

Dove at the times complained of by the plaintiff.
3.

The acts

complained of occurred in Roosevelt, Duchesne

County, Utah, and this

court has

jurisdiction over

the persons

Page 4
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113

and subject

114

Court.

matter of this dispute.

115

4.

116

plaintiff and

117

determine if the plaintiff had

118

belonging to the defendant Dove.

119

5.

The defendant

Van

request that

When

the

may

Venue properly lies in this

have

had

the plaintiff

defendant

taken

Van

cause

to

stop the

submit to a search to

or

secreted

found

no

any property

property

120

defendant Dove on the plaintiff's person

121

been placed

122

after the citation had been signed and the arrest had

123

defendants were

124

the initial detention and search and detention and search.

125

6.

The

by plaintiff,

actions

maliciously, even

127

plaintiff .

129
130

7.

the

it could have

and having not located the item until
been made,

without probable cause to take any action beyond

126

128

or where

of

of

the

defendants

were

not

done

though no probable cause existed for arresting

The plaintiff

is entitled

to general

damages for the

money he expended for posting bond and attorney fees.
8.

The plaintiff

is entitled

131

his public humiliation.

132

$2,500.00 is sufficient to compensate the plaintiff for the same.

133

9.

134

defendants,

135

entitled to punitive damages.

136
137
138

10.

Having found

The

the

Court

to compensatory damages for

no malicious

Court

Plaintiff ought

concludes

to be

concludes

that

conduct on
that

the

plaintiff

is

not

awarded his costs, expenses and

day of Atcvomaert, 19Q#.
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sum of

the part of the

interest as allowed by law.
Dated this /Si

the

BY ORDER OF THE COURT
139

142
143

Dennis L. Draney,
District Judge

r

144
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APPENDIX "D"

Judgment

SE0R6E E. MANGAN (2068), o-f
GEORGE E. MANGAN, APC
Attorney -for Plainti-f-f
47 North Second East
Roosevelt, Utah 84066
801-722-2428
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE .CBfcftlTX'^
STATE OF UTAH
H.O'ocr
JEFF Q. TUCKER,
Plainti-f-F ,
JUDGMENT
vs.
Civil No. 86-CV-94 D
Judge Dennis L. Draney

DEON N. DOVE, dba DOVE'S^
HAPPY SERVICE, a corporation
BENITO M. VAN and JOHN DOES
1-10,
De-fendants.

The

above

entitled

(teyftf

matter

came on regularly for trial on

September 15, 1987, be-fore the Honorable
plaintiff was

present with

Jxx^Ci

Dennis L.

Draney.

The

his attorney, George E. Mangan.

The

defendants were also present with their attorney Fred D. Howard.
Witnesses were called, sworn and did testify.

Numerous exhibits

were marked, identified and received into evidence.

Both parties

rested, and each argued their case to the Court and

responded to

inquiries

matter under

of

the

Court.

The

Court

took

the

advisement.
The Court having separately made and entered its Findings of
Fact and
fol1ows :

Conclusions of

Law, does

ORDER, ADJUDGE AND DECREE as

1.

The plaintiff shall have

and recover

judgment against

the defendants, jointly and separately.
2.
incurred

The plaintiff

in attorney fees to defend

3.
posted

is awarded

The plaintiff
by

the

judgment for

the $750,00 he

in the criminal

action.

is awarded judgment for the $106.00

plaintiff

if

the

bond

same was not returned to the

plaintiff or his mother.
4.

The

$2,500.00 far

plaintiff

is

awarded

judgment

in

the

sum

of

the humiliation he suffered by reason of his false

arrest by the defendants.
5.

Plaintiff shall

and expenses as required
6.

Plaintiff

is

forthwith file

a

Memorandum

in the Utah Rules of Civil
entitled to

pre-judgment

of Costs

Procedure.

interest on all

moneys found to be due and owing to the plaintiff, as provided

in

- UCA, as amended.
7.

The sums

awarded to plaintiff shall accrue interest at

the highest legal rate allowed for judgments, which

currently

is

12^i per annum.
Dated this /^T day of IMovcmbog> f 19B#.
BY ORDER OF THE COURT

Dennis L. Draney,
District Judge
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